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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action of Unlawful Detainer arising 
out of a breach by the Defendants-Appellants of a 
Gnifom1 Real Estate Contract by and between them-
selves and the Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was granted in favor of the Plaintiffs-
' Respondents ousting the Defendants-Appellants from 
1 
the subject property, and quiting title in the saia 
Plaintiffs, plus awarding treble damages Th · e rea. 
sonable rental value of the subject property was de-
termined to be $85.00 per month. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts as related by the Defend 
ants are somewhat complete, except that Plaintiffs 
add thereunto certain variations to conform with the 
record. 
The 2D Notice which the Plaintiffs had served 
upon the Defendants was the Notice to Quit as 
required by Section 78-36-6 ( 1), Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1953, as amended. <Exhibit PlZ, R,7&8l. 
The Notice to Quit was served upon both of the 
Defendants, personally. ( R. 8) No evidence was in· 
troduced to the contrary. When personal service I' 
obtained the requirement of the Statute is completrd. 
and no service by mail is required. Defendants r\iii 
not at any time in the Lower Court object to or cun· 
tradict this fact. 
The Lower Court made a finding that the Notic_e 
to Quit was properly served. CNo. 6,R,104') Defel]l!-
ants did not object to this finding. CR,70-80) 
·a 1 f monthh The subject contract CR,3) prov1 ec or 
Payments of $100.00 per month. Subsequently the ' $1'0 Oil. monthly payment was increased to that of 3 · 
2 
J 
per month, by agreement of the parties. Defendants 
11·ere consistently in default. (Exhibit P4-10) On 
mauy occasions they failed to make the complete 
payment. 
As of March 12, 1968, the date the Defendants 
were served the 1st Notice, they should have paid a 
total of $20,800.00, exclusive of the taxes and insur-
ance. The Carroll records with adjustments show 
that they paid the sum of $17 ,092.08, including taxes 
and insurance. The Court permitted Counsel for 
Plaintiffs to prepare an accounting showing interest 
on a monthly basis with interest figured to the 5th 
of the month, and to include the adjustments as 
supported by the evidence and as Plaintiffs' claimed 
them to be. In accordance with this accounting, the 
Court made a finding that the balance due on the 
contract was $4,106.05. (R,105) 
The Defendants claimed that the contract bal-
ance was less than the mortgage balance owed by 
Carroll to Doxey-Layton. The Court found that this 
was not so. The records showed that the Defendants 
11erP consistently in default with their payments, and 
therefore could not come before the Lower Court with 
'clean hands' according to the Principle of Equity; 
Yet they claimed that it was unconscionable for the 
lower Court to grant judgment to the Plaintiffs. 
The Lower Court determined that the rea-
l 'rmable rental value for the property was $85.00. For 
3 
1 
wrongfully withholding the property from the Pl · . 
tiffs after proper Notice to Quit was served upon 
them, the Lower Court granted restitution of the 
premises and awarded treble damages to the Plain· 
tiffs. The Plaintiffs in accordance with the Judgment 
gave Defendants Notice that they had a credit due 
them of $812.41, subject to their giving up possession 
and daily damages of $8.50. 
The letter of April 8, 1968, was answered with a 
request from the Plaintiffs that the Defendants sho11 
good faith by depositing with the Comt sufficient 
cash to cover any delinquency. A hearing before 
the Court was held, and the Court denied the Plain-
tiffs request and ordered a submission of their record) 
to the Defendants. 
The Defendants having consistently defaulted 
on their contract, the Court found that they were not 
entitled to anything more than a credit of 
per month, for rental of the property. This was in 
accordance with the law of the State of Utah. (Per· 
kins v. Spencer and Jacobson v. Swan) 
The Court's Memorandum Decision was an opui 
ion only and not intended as the Judgment. In fact 
the Court requested the Plaintiffs file Finding of Fact 
. b f ·e it woulo Conclus10ns of Law and Judgment e 01 
listen to any objecti,ons. This was done prior to 
'pressure' on the part of either of the lawyers. l 
62,63,64) 
4 
The 'pressure' was exerted after the Defendants 
filed their Objections to the Judgment of August 25, 
1969, and up to the time the Court signed the Judg-
ment of September 25, 1969. 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment were mailed to the Defendants on 
September 23, 1969, two days prior to the day the 
Court signed and entered them. ( R, 102, 106) 
On September 25, 1969, after Counsel for Plain-
tiffs had advised the Court that it would accept the 
rental value of $85 .00, per month, and so advised 
Counsel for Defendants, the Court signed and entered 
its Judgment granting restitution, quieting title and 
awarding treble damages. 
The offer of September 23, 1969, did not include 
the payment of the attorney's fees. In fact the De-
fendants' Counsel intended to pay the amount into 
comt but did not do so, and in fact admitted to Coun-
1el for Plaintiffs that the checks they held had not 
been paid. They were in for collection. 
Defendants had the time allowed them by the 
rules to file Objections to the Judgment of September 
25, 1969; however, they did not take advantage of 
their opportunity. They in fact did not file any 
Objections to the Judgment of September 25, 1969 
The Court did not deny them this right, neither did 
the Plaintiffs. 
5 
Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants Notice ol 
Entry of Judgment by mailing same on the 26th day 
of September, 1969. (R,107) On the 29th day ol 
September, 1969, Defendants obtained an Order Sta. 
ing the Judgment and filed an insufficient bond. 
was only after the Plaintiffs filed Objections and had 
a hearing before the Lower Court that the Defendant' 




THE REQUIREMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT IN REVIEW· 
ING THE INST ANT CASE ON APPEAL. 
In regard to the question of review of a case 
from the lower or trial court by this appellate 
in cases of equity, this court has the duty and obli· 
gation to sustain the lower court, unless the decree or 
judgment is found to be against the clear weight ol 
the evidence, or is contrary to law or establishea 
principles of equity, and in doubtful cases, the find· 
ings of the trial court should not be disturbed. 
In support of this doctrine, the Plaintiffs-Respon· 
dents quote from the two cases cited by the Defend· 
ants-Appellants as follows: 
" This being a suit in equity, we J'f · · · . , dence quired to pass upon the weight of the evi 
6 
In doubtful cases, the findings of the trial court 
should not be disturbed, because it hears the 
evidence which we but read, and it has the 
opportunity of observing the witnesses, their 
apparent frankness and candor or the lack 
thereof, and hence is in a better position than 
are we as a reviewing court to pass upon the 
weight that should be given the evidence ... " 
- - - - Croft v. Jemen, 40 P2D 198. (Utah) 
"In actions of equitable cognizance, this court 
will examine the record and weigh the evi-
dence, but the decree or judgment will be 
sustained on appeal unless it is found to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence or is 
contrary to law or established principles of 
equity." Cline v. Hullum, 43 P2D 152. (Okla-
homa) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully submit that 
in the instant case now before this Court that the 
Decree or Judgment of September 25, 1969 is sup-
ported by the evidence, is not contrary to law or 
established principles of equity and therefore it 
should not be disturbed, and they argue herein in 
support of this proposition. 
7 
POINT II 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING 
AND CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT !Hf 
DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT IN THEIR PERFORMING 
ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE UNIFORM REAl 
TATE CONTRACT, AND THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NO! 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF DEFAULT ON THE PART Of!Hf 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Section A 
The questi.on of the default of the 
in regard to the payments due and owing on the con· 
tract is uncontradicted. In this respect the weight of 
the evidence is clearly in favor of the Plaintiffs ana 
supports the Judgment of the District Court. 
On July 1, 1954, Plaintiffs and Defendants, a' 
Seller and Buyer, entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract whereby the Seller agreed to sell, and the 
Buyer agreed to purchase certain real estate situate 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, at an agreed purcha'e 
price payable at the rate of $100.00, per month. 
sequently this monthly payment was increased tn 
$150.00, per month. (Exhibit P-8, P-28, R,3 & R,10! 
Defendants failed to comply with the terms for 
monthly payments on many occasions, and the con· 
tract was consistently in default. (Exhibits P-tf-!0. 
R, 184, 185) 
· 1 y·ment hall' The final failure to make a time Y pa 
f J ry j Ve· pened on or about the 9th day o anua ' 
1 
8 j 
when the Defendants gave Plaintiffs a check for 
$150.00, which bounced. Defendants however were 
finally given credit for the January 9th payment 
when they subsequently gave the Plaintiffs $150.00 
cash sometime in February, 1968. This incident 
culminated when the Plaintiffs finally called a halt 
to the entire matter on March 11, 1968, when they 
issued and caused to be served the 1st Notice upon 
the Defendants. Said Notice gave the Defendants 
the alternative of either bringing the contract current 
or returning the property to the Plaintiffs. At the 
time of issuing the 1st Notice, the February and 
March payments had not been paid. 
To show the consistent default status of the Car-
roll-Birdsall contract a schedule showing a compari-
son between the total annual payments required and 
the total annual amounts paid is as follows, to-wit: 
SCHEDULE p 
B 
A Payments Made As 
Total Due Per Per Carroll's Records DATE Contract & Admendment With Adjustments 
1954 $ 900.00 $ 300.00 h. 1955 1,200.00 951.08 c. 1956 1,200.00 1,049.02 d. 1957 1,200.00 1,308.92 e. 1958 1,200.00 1, 159.40 f. 1959 1,200.00 1,256.12 r, 1%0 1,200.00 635.00 ,. h. 1961 1,450.00 1,146.37 1962 1,800.00 1,800.00 1963 1,800.00 1,653.20 
9 
k. 1964 1,800.00 1,650.94 1. 1965 1,800.00 1,552.70 m. 1966 1,800.00 1,281.33 n. 1967 1,800.00 1,200.00 o. 1968 450.00 150.00 
p. Totals 20,800.00 17,092.08 
An analysis of the above schedule shows that the 
Defendants were in default on the contract earh 
year except the years: 1957, 1959, and 1962. 
Plaintiffs submit that the weight of the evidence 
supports the findings and conclusions of the lower 
court that the Defendants were in default on their 
contract. 
Section B 
Defendants' contention that they were not in 
default for failing to make the required monthlv 
payments because Plaintiffs failed to convey subject 
property to them in connection with the Dow1'· 
Layton mortgage is not according to the terms of the 
contract, nor equitable. 
Defendants appear to be somewhat immaturein 
trying to excuse their failure to comply with 
· bl the Plam· terms of the contract by trymg to ame . 
tiffs for their faults. Defendants should recognize 
h uffer the their wrongs and be mature enoug to s 
consequences of their own acts. 
10 
l 
Plaintiffs cite the terms of the contract to which 
reference should be made in regard to the default 
to which the Plaintiffs refer, and the default to which 
the Defendants refer, as follows: 
The clause regarding conveyance to the Buyer 
is as follows: 
"The seller is hereby given the option to exe-
cute and maintain a loan secured by mortgage 
upon said property of not to exceed$ (contract 
balance) ... bearing interest at the rate of not 
to exceed -6- per cent. When the principal 
has been reduced to the amount of the loan 
and mortgage, the Seller agrees to convey and 
the buyer agrees to accept title to the above 
described property subject to said loan and 
mortgage." 
The clause of the contract regarding forfeiture 
and repossession is as follows: 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to 
make any payments when the same shall be-
come due, or within 30 days thereafter, the 
Seller shall, at his option, be released from 
all obligations in law and equity to convey 
said property and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the 
Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liqui-
dated damages for the non-performance of the 
co11tract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller 
may, at his option, re-enter and take possession 
of said premises . . . " 
11 
Also the clause of the contract regarding con- I 
veyance of title is as follows: 
"The Seller on payments hereui 
reserved to be paid at the times and in the man-
ner above mentioned agrees to execute ano 
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and suf. 
ficient warranty deed conveying the title tn 
the above described premises free and clear 
of all encumbrances except as herein men-
tioned and except as . . . " 
Accordingly, before the Defendants would oe 
entitled to have title to the subject property conveyeu 
to themselves, the contract .on their part would haw 
to be current and in good standing; otherwise, the· 
would have no recourse. To think or do othern1s1 
would appear to the Plaintiffs to be contrary to the 
terms .of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
and against the principles of equity and public poller 
Section C 
For sake of argument only and without conceea 
ing that Defendants' have a point that they shoulil 
have been given additi.onal credit for payments nr 
amounts alleged to be overlooked, wrongly includea. 
erroneously entered, or for whatever reason as ma: 
be applicable, the Plaintiffs comment on the evideucP 
in answer to Defendants' Brief which presents thN 
items under POINT II, beginning at Page 10. 
ITEM 1. <The $25.00 amount) JI B. d 11 cre111 1. Carroll testified that he gave ir sa .t 1,, for this amount, and explained that 1 1 '' 
12 
the item shown· on Exhibit 22-P, as the 
entry where he had first made it as the date 
of March 7th and then scratched it out and 
entered it as February23 .. Mr. Birdsall did 
not controvert this testimony or introduce 
any other evidence than the receipt to show 
otherwise. (R, 179, 189) 
ITEM 2. !The $35.00 amount) 
1. Carroll testified that at the time of this pay-
ment there was a question of bouncing 
checks, and that during the period of this 
check, he showed tw.o payments of $35.00, 
each, and that this certain $35.00, was in-
cluded in the payments recorded for Jan-
uary, 1958. (R, 180-182) 
ITEMS 3 & 5. (Taxes of $133.98 for 1960 and of $189.61 
for 1965) 
1. The agent from Doxey-Layton testified that 
the taxes were paid by Doxey-Layton, that 
Mr. Carroll made the payments on the con-
tract, and that the payments on the con-
tract were current. Carroll testified that 
the taxes were paid through Doxey-Layton. 
Mr. Birdsall testified that he could not re-
member about paying the taxes for 1959. 
He could not remember that far back. Also, 
Mr. Birdsall did not keep a record of pay-
ments made on the contract to Mr. Carroll. 
Carroll testified that the taxes for these 
years should have been included in his 
records. <R,224; R,174, R,210; R,271) 
ITEM 4. !Bounced check for $43.251 
1. This amount of $43.25, is represented by a 
check which the Bank returned unpaid. 
13 
Birdsall never contradicted this 0 Carroll testified that it probably sho:1(
1 
have been charged back mto the account 
He further testified that because of bounc-
ing he had a_ constant problem oi 
chargmg back such items. (Exhibits 25.p 
R, 183) . 
ITEM 6. <Tape Recorder - $22.17 difference) 
1. Carroll testified that Birdsall obtaimcl 0 
tape recorder for him at the wholesalr 
price, and that he gave him credit acconl 
ingly. Birdsall did not controvert thi, 
testimony by denying this conversation 
alleged to by Carroll. In fact there is not 
testimony in the record which contradict; 
Carroll's testimony that Birdsall was to re· 
ceive any thing other than the wholesale 
price for the tape recorder. CaJToJl, 
records show what Carroll understood the 
wholesale price of the tape recorder to he 
(Exhibit P, 10; R, 165, 166) 
ITEM 7. <The payment of $125.001 
1. Carroll testified that he received on!Y one 
payment on March 13, 1967, from Birds'.'!!. 
an·d that this was paid by the Bishop wlml! 
Carroll thought was sent through the mail 
The original receipt and the duphcatr 
· to the made by Mr. Carroll were not given . 
Birdsalls. They remained in the possesswn 
of the Carrolls. until Mr. Carroll gave tl
1
1
1elll to Farr. Blauer took them from Farr'so w 
over to Rigtrup's office and 
turned them to Farr's office. m, 1?!. 1'· 
272,273,275,238,239, 172) 
14 
2. Birdsall went to the hospital on February 
22, 1967, with a heart attack. He testified 
of the incident as follows: CR, 277) 
"February 22, 1967, I was admitted to 
the hospital with a heart attack, and we 
hadn't paid the payment before, and 
my wife took the payment up and the 
check that Bishop Metcalf gave her, 
because he paid the payments on the 
house while I was in the hospital. And 
Mr. Carroll told me that we would 
have to make up the extra, $150.00 that 
was due on the three months, on ac-
count that he wouldn't accept the 
$125.00, and that is exactly what we 
did .... " 
Exhibit P10 contradicts Birdsall's testi-
mony. It shows that on February 23, 1967, 
the day before Birdsall entered the Hospital 
a payment of $75.00 had been recorded by 
Carroll. For the month of January, 1967, 
a payment of $150.00, had been made. 
Previously to that for December, 1966, the 
entry of $81.33, for the tape recorder was 
made. 
Mrs. Birdsall testified that she couldn't re-
member about the payment of March 13, 
1967. CR, 219) 
In addition to the above items, Defendants at one 
time contended that they should be allowed credit for 
Sli0.00, as a payment on July 9, 1954, and included 
in the Blauer accounting. (Exhibit 32D) The court 
did not allow them to have credit for this item, and 
15 
rightly so since the weight of the evidence support J 
this conclusion. <R, 267 to 270) eu 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to include an iteni 
for $16.43, of pro-rated insurance which the court 
allowed and was included in the Farr accounting bu 
excluded from the Blauer accounting. <Exhibit +OP. 
R, 134, 135) 
Carroll also reflected in his account and Blauer 
excluded from his without any evidence or good rea 
son, the fees and costs retained by Bayles, of $16.611: 
and a 2D attorney's fee of $50.00. (Exhibit P2, p1,, 
PB, 32D) 
Blauer also excluded from his accounting a 
bounced check which Carroll shows reflected in hi' 
records just prior to his entry dated the 22nd day ol 
February, 1965. Defendants did not introduce 
evidence to contradict that fact that this was a corrrit 
entry. The court allowed it to remain, and theweigll' 
of the evidence supports the fact that it should remain 
as indicated in the Carroll records. CR, 9 & f. 
32D) g, 
Blauer's accounting contains an err.or of $115.:: h. 
under date of January 5, 1955, which should be co'. 
f J 9 rected. Also the bounced check o anuary ' · c 
was improperly deducted under date of January · 
1967, in the Blauer accounting. (Exhibit 32D! 
16 
l 
The weight of the evidence supports the Courts 
Finding of Fact No. 11, that the contract balance as 
of March 5, 1968, was $4,106.05. Also the Blauer 
accounting supports this finding after adjusting his 
balance of March 5, 1968, of $2,538.23, as shown on 
Page 7 of his accounting. (Exhibit 32D) 
The following schedule reflects these above 
changes and shows that the Blauer balance would 
exceed the above contract balance referred to in Find-
ing of Fact No. 11. <R, 105) 
SCHEDULE B 
Date Explanation Adjustment Interest Totals Adf. Bal. 
a. 3/12/68 
Blauer Balance __ $2,538.23 
b. 7/9/54 
Earnest Money .. 170.00 208.11 378.11 2,916.34 
c. 11/30/54 
Ins. pro-ration .... 16.43 17.90 34.33 2,950.67 
d. 1/5/55 
Blauer error ...... 115.72 133.70 249.42 3,200.09 
e. 2/25/55 
Ii Duplicate pmt ... 25.00 28.44 53.44 3,253.53 
f. 1/10/58 
Duplicate pmt ... 35.00 28.40 63.40 3,316.93 
g, 5/12/58 
h Fees & costs ........ 16.60 12.72 29.32 3,346.25 . 11/30/60 
1 
. Taxes - 1960 ...... 133.98 71.16 205.14 3,551.39 
1· 9I1I61 
. Fees .................. 50.00 23.25 73.25 3,624.64 
]. 6/20/64 








Bounced check 133.38 26.71 160.09 3,838 
11/30/65 
Taxes - 1965 ...... 189.61 26.98 216.59 
12/16/66 
Tape recorder .... 22.17 1.65 23.82 
1/9/67 
Bounced check .. 150.00 10.87 160.87 4,239.ai 
POINT III 
THE CONCLUSION BY THE LOWER COURT THAT DEFEND 
ANTS WERE IN DEFAULT, ENTITLED THE PLAINTIFFS, AIA 
MATTER OF LAW, TO THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THI 
LOWER COURT. 
This Court has stated in the Perkins v. Spencrr 
case, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2D 446, 452, what doctrine 
it follows in cases such as the instant case, to-wit: 
". . . This Court is committed to the doctrine. 
that where the parties to a contract stipulafr 
the amount of liquidated damages that 
be paid in case of a breach, such stipulation!' 
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount 
stipulated is not disproportionate to the darn 
ages actually sustained .... " 
Furthermore, in the Perkins V. Spencer case, uii· 
Court outlined a formula to guide the lower Court in 
determining damages in such cases, and at Page +ii. 
243 P2D, it is as follows, to-wit: 
"The vendors are entitled to any loss Oi I 





(4) For the fair rental value .of the pro-
perty during the period of 9ccupancy. 
"The total of such sums should be deducted 
from the total amount paid in, plus any im-
provements for which it would be fair to allow 
recovery, and any remaining differences 
awarded to the plaintiffs." 
In the instant case, the Lower Court and Plaintiffs 
followed the above doctrine and formula. The Lower 
Court determined that the Defendants were in de-
fault, and that the reasonable rental value of the 
property was Eighty Five & No/100 ($85.00) Dollars 
per month CR, 101-106). The Plaintiffs followed 
the formula, figured out the differences and 
then informed the Defendants by written notice sent 
to their attorney on the 29th day of September, 1969, 
m, 111) that they, the Plaintiffs were ready 
to deliver to the Defendants what ever amounts were 
due and owing as a difference between the amounts 
paid by the Defendants, and the rental set by the 
court plus treble damages according t.o the Judgment 
entered on September 25, 1969, as follows: 
Total amounts paid by the Defendants $16,936.91 
less: 
Rental- 7 /1/1954 to 7 /1/1969 
$15,385.00 
Damages - 7/2/1969 to 9/25I1969 
739.50 16,124.50 
Amount due and tendered to Defendants $ 812.41 
19 
The Defendants were also advised that the saia 
amount of $812.41, diminished at the rate of 
per. day, until they gave up possession and quit tht 
sub1ect property. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs-Respondents refer thiJ 
Court to the Law of the Jacobson v. Swan case, 3 litaii 
2D 59, 278 P2D 294, and assert that in accordanre 
with same they were and are entitled to restitution 
of the subject property, and treble damages all assel 
forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. 
and Judgment of September 25, 1969 (Court Fili. 
101-106). 
Plaintiffs-Respondents submit to this Comi that 
the said Judgment is in accordance with good con· 
scious, in accordance with the law of the Perkinsana 
Jacobson cases, in accordance with the principle oi 
equity applicable to this case, and the establisheil 
doctrine and formula of this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE LOWER cour 
WAS INTENDED ONLY AS AN OPINION OF THE COUil 
PRELIMINARY TO THE FILING OF THE FINDINGS OF FACTI 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT. 
A review of the Record of the Lower Court shoult! 
indicate to this Court that the Lower Court neier 
. . b fo:JI intended the Memorandum Decision to e a 







After the Lower Court filed its Memorandum 
Decision, Plaintiffs filed Objections and Amended 
Objections to said Memorandum ( R, 62-64) and sent 
Defendants a Notice CR, 63) advising of a hearing 
on July 29, 1969, before Judge Hanson, to consider 
Plaintiffs' Objections. On the 29th of July, when 
Plaintiffs counsel appeared for the hearing, Judge 
Hanson advised that before he could hear any objec-
tions that Plaintiffs' counsel would have to prepare 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
e. I Plaintiffs prepared the Findings of Fact, Con-
1 clusions of Law, and Judgment which were signed 
and entered by the Court on August 25, 1969 ( C, 65-
69). Then Defendants filed Objections (R, 70-80), 
and the Plaintiffs filed Answers CR, 94-100) to said 
Objections. 
Defendants' Objections were subsequently heard 
and denied. Plaintiffs prepared amended Findings 
of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment <R, 
101-106). Copies of same were mailed to the Defend-
ants on September 23, 1969, two days before the court 
signed and entered said Judgment on September 25, 
1969 <R, 106). 
Plaintiffs thereafter on September 26, 1969, 
sent the Defendants a Notice of Judgment <R, 
the Defendants a Notice of Judgment (Court File, 
l07) advising of the Judgment, and among other 
things, that the Court had determined the reasonable 
rental value of the property was $85 per month. 
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Based upon the difference between the reason-
able rental value of $85 per month from July 1, 19i4. 
to July 1, 1969, and the total amounts paid in, thP 
Plaintiffs notified the Defendants that they had dut 
them a credit of $812.41 and tendered the sametothe 
Defendants subject, however, to 1he condition that 
they would deliver up possession of the property tr! 
the Plaintiffs (R, 111). 
Defendants did not file any Objections to the 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
of the 25th day of September, 1969. However, thev 
did file a Motion to Stay the Execution of said Judg· 
ment, which the Court granted. It was from the 
Judgment of September 25, 1969, that the Defendant1 
appealed (R, 113). 
The Defendants did not appeal from the Memo-
randum Decision which was entered July 2, 
(R, 61). 
The Defendants did not Object to the Memo· 
randum Decision until or in conjunction with their 
Objections to the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment of August 25, 1969, a period of 51 
days. 
The Court File and Transcript of Record appear 
to confirm the fact that the Defendants and the Plain 
tiffs considered the Memorandum Decision to be 
1 t by the nothing more than an informa statemen 
Olurt. 
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In WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 27, at Page 
45 and 49, the word Memorandum is defined as 
follows: 
A 'memorandum' in common parlance is an 
informal record. Patterson v. Beard, 288 NW 
414, 416; 227 IOWA 401; 125 ALR 393. 
A memorandum merely stating the con-
clusions of a judge on an issue before him, and 
giving direction as to an order, judgment, or 
decree which may be entered, is an opinion, 
whether labeled 'memorandum' or 'conclusion' 
or 'opinion'; and from an opinion no appeal 
lies. In Re Beam, 117 A. 613, 93 N. J. Eq. 593. 
The case cited by Defendant, Drury v. Lunce-
ford, 18 Utah 2D 74, 415 P2D 662, is not in point with 
the case before this Court. The Drury case dealt with 
the question of the basic rights bestowed upon a per-
son by an Order granting a New Trial. 
This Appellate Court has previous said in the 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, case, 
133 P2D 919, 922, in regard to a final judgment that: 
It must appear that that 'which is offered as 
the record of a judgment is really such and not 
an order for a judgment or a mere memo-
randum (emphasis added) from which the 
judgment was to be drawn. 
Also in the Clegg case this Court has in effect said 
that a Judgment to be final must be supported by 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
23 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Memo. 
randum Decision of the Lower Court was intendea 
to be only a memorandum in the sense that it Wai 
an informal record of the court's conclusions or opin-
ions and did not bind the Court nor preclude it frorn 
entering its Judgment of September 25, 1969. 
POINT V 
THE AWARD OF TREBLE DAMAGES BY THE LOWER COU!l 
WAS PROPER IN THAT IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE lAW 
AND THE EVIDENCE AND NOT CONTRARY TO THf 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. 
Section 78-36-6 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated 19j3
1 
as amended, provides that the Notice to Quit may be I 
served: 
By delivering a copy to the tenant personally 
Plaintiffs' Notice to Quit (Exhibit P-12, with 
Return of Notice attached) was personally semd 
upon the Defendants on the 25th day of March, 1968. 
Deputy Sheriff, L. W. McAllister, certified that he 
personally served Phil M. Birdsall and M. La Veine 
Birdsall on said date in Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
record shows this fact. The Defendants did not intro 
duce any evidence to the contrary. The Lower Courl 
made a Finding to the effect that such Notice to Qwl 
was properly served (R, 104). 
Plaintiffs Notice to Quit was admitted in 
dence without any objection and with the consent 01 
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Defendants' attorney, Kenneth Rigtrup. Neither did 
Defendants make any objection to said Notice to Quit 
either at the trial or at anytime thereafter in the 
Lower Court CR, 23 & R, 70-80). There is no 
evidence to contradict its sufficiency. 
This Court should not be confused by the Defend-
ants attempt to invalidate the Plaintiffs' 1st notice, 
the Notice advising of the default (Notice to Pay or 
Quit) which was served upon the Defendants prior 
to the service of the Notice to Quit. 
Plaintiffs submit that the Perkins case as cited by 
Defendants is not authority to support their claim that 
Plaintiffs' 1st Notice is invalid. 
Plaintiffs submit that the Perkins case is author-
ity to support their claim that the Lower Court 
properly awarded treble damage. 
The Perkins case sets forth the doctrine which 
this Court has followed in unlawful detainer actions. 
It outlines a formula to help determine damages 
which might be suffered by one entitled to reposses-
sion of property wrongfully detained. (See Plaintiffs' 
discussion of the Perkins case in POINT III) 
In the instant case the 2D Notice: the Notice to 
was served upon the Defendants in accordance 
with Section 78-36-6 ( 1). After receipt of the 2D 
N . otJce they remained in possession. They neither 
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brought the contract current nor gave up possessi on. 
The Court found that they were in default, and that 
the reasonable rental value was Eighty Five & 
No/100 ($85.00) Dollars per month. The weightoi 
the evidence supports this finding CR, 159, 160, 161.. 
187, 200, 201, 203, 217, 218) ' 
"?nder these circumstances the laws of Utah I 
sustam an award for treble damages and restitution 
of the property. (See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 
468, 243 P2D 446 and Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2D 
59, 278 P2D 294) 
Plaintiffs submit that in accordance with Section I 
78-36-1 O, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sa amended: 
the cases herein cited and the weight of the evideme 
the lower court properly entered Judgment in their 
favor. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion Plaintiffs submit to this court that 
the lower court properly weighed the evidence, aml 
in so doing arrived at a judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. In reaching iG 
decision the lower court had the benefit of listening 
' to and observing the witnesses as they testified under 
oath on the stand, of watching their demenor,_renct 
ing to their reactions and personality, to 
their speach inflections, etc. A court setting whJCh 1' 
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impossible to reflect in the record or transfer up to 
this court. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs submit to this court that: 
1. The lower court did not allow a forfeiture. 
2. That the Judgment of the lower court was 
rendered in good conscience. It would not 
shock the conscience of one who had 
breached the terms of his contract. 
3. That the Defendant have received all that 
to which they are entitled in accordance 
with the terms of their Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, and with the established princi-
ples of equity, and law. 
4. That after many many consistent defaults 
the Plaintiffs acting in good faith declared 
a default and requested repossession of the 
subject property. 
5. That it would be against established princi-
ples of equity and public policy in addition 
to being contrary to the terms of the con-
tract for this court to require the Plaintiffs 
to convey subject property in accordance 
with Defendants contention that the Plain-
tiffs should have done so in connection with 
the Doxey-Layton mortgage. 
6. That the Judgment of September 25, 1969, 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted 
LIONEL M. FARR 
914 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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